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Abstract
Research suggests that the coronavirus pandemic disproportionately affected poor commu-
nities. However, relatively little is known about how this differential impact affected support 
for, and compliance with, COVID-19 lockdown policies. This article examines the relation-
ship between socioeconomic inequalities and public opinion towards COVID-19 contain-
ment measures in Peru. Despite the strict quarantine measures adopted by the government 
of Peru, the country struggled to contain the spread of the disease. We designed and imple-
mented a nationally representative survey in Peru and found that economically vulnerable 
sectors are more likely to oppose the quarantine and are more likely to defy the stay- at- 
home recommendations to leave home and go to work. Our contribution highlights that 
poor citizens’ housing and economic conditions can explain why the poor are more likely to 
react negatively to COVID-19 lockdown policies.
Resumen
nvestigaciones previas sugieren que la pandemia del coronavirus afectó de manera de-
sproporcionada a las comunidades más pobres y vulnerables socioeconómicamente. Sin 
embargo, se sabe relativamente poco acerca de cómo este impacto diferencial afectó 
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al apoyo y cumplimiento de las políticas de mitigación del COVID-19. Este artículo 
examina la relación entre las desigualdades socioeconómicas y el apoyo de la opinión 
pública a las medidas de contención del COVID-19 en Perú. A pesar de las estrictas 
medidas de cuarentena adoptadas por el gobierno, Perú experimentó grandes dificul-
tades para contener la propagación de la enfermedad. Diseñamos e implementamos 
una encuesta representativa a nivel nacional en Perú y encontramos que los sectores 
económicamente vulnerables tienen más probabilidades de oponerse a la cuarentena y 
es más probable que desafíen las recomendaciones de quedarse en casa para poder salir 
a trabajar. Nuestra contribución destaca que las condiciones económicas y de vivienda 
de los ciudadanos explican por qué es más probable que los grupos menos privilegiados 
reaccionen negativamente a las políticas de mitigación del COVID-19.
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Introduction
In the early days of the pandemic, the COVID-19 disease was sometimes described as an 
“equal opportunity offender” (Bainbridge, 2020) because people of all backgrounds 
could be infected and wealthy countries could suffer large outbreaks. However, it soon 
became clear that the most economically vulnerable sectors of society suffered dispro-
portionately from the pandemic in every country.
Not only are the poor more likely to become infected by COVID-19, but they are also 
at much greater risk of suffering devastating economic consequences from the pandemic 
and the containment measures adopted to combat it. The more economically vulnerable 
groups are more exposed to these combined risks as a result of several factors, including 
precarious frontline jobs, crowded housing, poor access to public services, and lack of 
savings.
While the poor suffer disproportionately from COVID-19 everywhere, we surmise 
this differential impact is exacerbated in developing areas, and especially in contexts of 
high economic inequality and labour informality. Poor informal workers in developing 
countries have no access to unemployment or healthcare benefits, and they cannot afford 
to stay home to prevent infection because they often lack savings. Moreover, the types 
of jobs they have cannot be performed remotely. Abiding by public health recommenda-
tions to stay home during the early phase of the pandemic could result in hunger and 
extreme poverty for these vulnerable groups.
In this article, we study the differential impact of COVID-19 in the developing world 
by focusing on the case of Peru, a Latin American country that suffered one of the worst 
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outbreaks in the world. Peru provides an excellent setting for this research for three rea-
sons. First, Peru struggled to contain the spread of COVID-19 despite the strict quaran-
tine measures adopted by the government early on in the pandemic. Second, 
non- compliance was one of the main challenges the government faced when attempting 
to reduce contagion risk. Reports about crowding in popular markets and bus stations in 
impoverished areas of the country raised the alarm about the ineffectiveness of the lock-
down in low- income communities. Finally, the socioeconomic inequalities in Peru, as in 
other Latin American countries, are such that less privileged groups may face greater 
obstacles to abiding by the quarantine measures. These conditions make Peru a suitable 
country for studying the relationship between socioeconomic inequality and COVID-19 
public opinion.
Our goal in this study is twofold. First, this article provides descriptive evidence of 
the several ways in which COVID-19 had a disproportionate negative impact on more 
economically vulnerable sectors of the population. Second, the article explains how this 
differential impact affected attitudes about (and compliance with) containment measures 
and social distancing guidelines. Based on theories that highlight the role of self- interest 
in shaping policy attitudes and behaviours (Doherty et al., 2006; Downs, 1957), we 
expect individuals in an economically vulnerable situation to react negatively to COVID-
19 lockdown policies. The adverse reaction of low- income groups, we argue, includes 
lower support for lockdown measures and weaker compliance with stay- at- home 
recommendations.
To understand how socioeconomic inequality affects attitudes and behaviours towards 
COVID-19 lockdown policies, we implemented a nationally representative survey by 
telephone at the end of May 2020. As the key independent variable, we use an indicator 
that captures socioeconomic vulnerabilities from a multi- dimensional perspective by 
including questions about education and access to crucial goods and services such as 
internet and private health insurance. Meanwhile, our dependent variables capture peo-
ple’s preferences about health measures and their willingness to do certain activities in 
the near future. We use a linear probability model with fixed effects at the department 
level to explore how socioeconomic vulnerabilities predict these outcomes of interest.
Our results show that Peruvians who are economically vulnerable are less likely to 
support quarantine measures and more likely to support the reopening of the economy 
than those who are economically privileged. We also find that the willingness to comply 
with stay- at- home guidelines depends on the level of economic necessity: less privileged 
citizens are more likely to ignore stay- at- home recommendations and leave home to go 
to work. That said, they are not more likely to engage in leisure activities outside of the 
home than the more privileged citizens.
These findings make two contributions. First, the results are consistent with the theo-
retical arguments that emphasise the role that material conditions play in shaping policy 
attitudes and behaviours (Becker, 1993; Cialdini, 1991; Kim, 2014). This article, thus, 
provides novel evidence from a different set of policy preferences during a public health 
emergency that is consistent with such approaches. Second, this article provides some 
individual- level evidence of public opinion towards quarantine measures that 
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complements existing studies showing that poor communities were hardest hit by the 
health and economic consequences of the pandemic. In recent studies, scholars have 
argued that one of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of lockdowns in low- income com-
munities was the economic and social inequalities that affected how poor and rich expe-
rience the pandemic (Bennett, 2021; Hummel et al., 2021). For instance, Hummel et al. 
(2021) show that poor departments in Bolivia had worse health outcomes and relaxed 
stay- at- home orders earlier. This is due, in part, to the low state capacity and the low- 
quality public services that exist in the poorer departments (Hummel et al., 2020), but 
also to the lower ability of people living in poor areas to abide by stringent public health 
recommendations. Similarly, Bennett (2021) demonstrates that in poor areas of Chile’s 
capital city quarantine effectiveness was lower than in rich areas. But there has been little 
individual- level evidence to support the assumption that more economically vulnerable 
individuals have weaker support for lockdown policies. We fill this gap by showing that 
both support for and compliance with lockdown policies, at the individual level, are 
affected by socioeconomic conditions.
The Disproportionate Effect of the Pandemic on Low-Income 
Groups
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment and wages is highly unequal 
and exacerbates existing inequalities. Studies conducted in economically advanced 
OECD countries reveal that low- skilled, less educated, and low- income workers were 
more likely to lose their jobs or to suffer a drop in earnings as a result of the public health 
crisis. Work arrangements also mattered. More specifically, employees with permanent 
contracts were considerably less likely to lose their jobs than workers with alternative 
work arrangements. Moreover, workers in occupations that cannot be performed 
remotely were more likely to see their working hours reduced (Adams- Prassl et al., 
2020; Montenovo et al., 2020).
The disparate impact of the pandemic on different socioeconomic groups was miti-
gated in OECD countries by the adoption of generous emergency programmes to help 
the most economically vulnerable groups. These policies included increasing unemploy-
ment benefits, distributing stimulus checks, or subsidising companies so that they could 
maintain their workforces (Birnbaum, 2020). Such large- scale policy interventions are 
not available in developing countries, which can lead to greater and more rapid negative 
effects on the economic well- being of large segments of the population (Evans and Over, 
2020).1
There are three factors that make the negative effects of the pandemic on the eco-
nomic well- being of the more vulnerable sectors of the population much more acute in 
developing countries.
First, there are large inequalities in access to digital networks and in the skills required 
to use computerised networks optimally. While access to internet is widespread in eco-
nomically advanced countries, digital inequalities create a major vulnerability to the 
sanitary and economic consequences of COVID-19 in low- and middle- income 
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countries (Beaunoyer et al., 2020; Robinson et al., 2015; Sambuli, 2016). People who 
lack reliable access to computers and reliable internet access in their houses are not able 
to work remotely. They are also much less able to socially isolate since they need to 
leave their houses to engage in essential activities such as grocery shopping and banking. 
Moreover, the lack of internet access makes it harder for people to maintain social con-
tacts during lockdown periods, which can have detrimental effects on mental health 
(Beaunoyer et al., 2020; Guitton, 2020). In sum, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbates 
already existing digital inequalities and exposes the most economically vulnerable sec-
tors to considerably greater economic and health risks.
Second, developing countries (and Latin American countries in particular) tend to 
have large informal sectors (Gasparini and Tornarolli, 2009; Portes and Hoffman, 2003). 
The informal segment of the labour market is made up of non- professionals, unskilled 
labourers, marginal workers, the self- employed, domestic and family workers, and 
workers in small firms – all of whom engage in labour activities that are not regulated by 
the state and lack access to the social security system or pension system (Hussmans, 
2004; Saavedra and Chong, 1999). Informal workers are less protected against the vicis-
situdes of professional life even during normal times since they lack “access to protec-
tion against health and unemployment shocks, to savings for old age, to employment 
protection and to labour related benefits” (Tornarolli et al., 2014: 3). It is therefore not 
surprising that they also suffer much more acutely from the COVID-19 pandemic. To 
begin with, informal workers (e.g. street vendors, shopkeepers, and domestic workers) 
have jobs that simply cannot be done remotely (Hummel et al., 2020: 120). Not going to 
work for a few weeks as a result of a government- imposed lockdown might mean that 
informal workers do not receive any form of compensation during that period. Moreover, 
informal workers do not have unemployment benefits when they lose their jobs. While 
some governments in the developing world implemented emergency programmes to 
provide cash assistance to the population during lockdowns, informal workers are harder 
to reach because they are not on state payrolls. This can generate important delays in the 
disbursement of funds, which can lead to acute economic distress among informal 
workers.
Third, the housing and living conditions of vulnerable economic groups in develop-
ing countries are often dire, which exacerbates the health risks associated with COVID-
19. In particular, poor families tend to suffer from overcrowding and a lack of amenities 
(Rondinelli, 1990; Tipple and Willis, 2004). Crowded housing implies that several gen-
erations live together in small homes in very dense communities. Public health recom-
mendations to maintain social distance and isolate the elderly ring hollow in these 
housing conditions (Hummel et al., 2020: 121). Moreover, in low- income communities, 
people often lack basic amenities such as a refrigerator or private sanitation. Again, 
those housing deficiencies make it very hard for the poor to stay home and maintain the 
recommended social distance since they have to go out several times a day to buy food 
and use the toilet.
In sum, the pandemic’s disproportionate effect on the most economically vulnerable 
individuals is exacerbated in developing nations. This disparity is partly due to three 
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realities: digital inequalities, the large informal sector, and poor living conditions. These 
structural characteristics of developing nations were undoubtedly present in Peru when 
the pandemic hit. In the following section, we provide descriptive evidence of how the 
living and working conditions of poor Peruvians differ from those of more economically 
privileged Peruvians. The nature of these socioeconomic inequalities in Peru, we will 
argue, results in vastly different attitudes and behaviours towards the COVID-19 policies 
adopted by the Peruvian government.
Inequalities in Peru
The pandemic struck the poor the hardest in Peru. When the WHO declared COVID-19 
a global pandemic, the government of Peru adopted some of the swiftest and strictest 
containment measures in the region. The national quarantine banned people from leav-
ing their homes, except for essential trips. Yet remaining at home required living condi-
tions that less privileged Peruvians do not enjoy, such as adequate housing, access to 
water, and sanitation. Quarantining also required workers to perform their jobs from 
home. However, many Peruvians lack access to internet or a computer at home and have 
informal jobs in occupations that rarely lend themselves to remote work. In this section, 
we document the inequalities in housing and working conditions that made quarantining 
a difficult feat in Peru, especially for the poor.
The Peruvian government introduced harsh and early measures to stop the spread of 
the virus. A state of national emergency was announced in mid- March, just a few days 
after the country’s first coronavirus case was confirmed. It established a nationwide 
quarantine that included mandatory social isolation, restriction of movement, and a ban 
on public gatherings. The mobility constraints were enforced by the police in the first 
few weeks,2 but by late April the government started a gradual – albeit erratic – process 
of relaxing the national quarantine. A crucial step towards this flexibilisation arrived on 
2 May, when the president announced a plan to re- open the economy in four phases. 
Throughout this time, however, the disadvantaged citizens suffered the most. A detailed 
chronology of the changing characteristics of the quarantine mandate in Peru can be 
found in Appendix A in supplemental material.
Compliance with quarantine measures required living and working conditions that 
economically vulnerable Peruvians cannot afford. While the lockdown’s main goal was 
to reduce the infection rate, the policy did not take into account problems with over-
crowded housing. Peruvian families frequently share the same dwelling unit with other 
families. Overcrowding has been associated with the rapid transmission of respiratory 
diseases, and it can negatively impact mental health. Even though household crowding 
has decreased over the last decade in Peru, the gap between the poor and the rich has 
remained large. An analysis of the 2019 Peruvian Household Survey (ENAHO) indi-
cates that overcrowding is 12 percentage points higher among the population living in 
extreme poverty than among the non- poor.3
There is also a large gap in access to basic services and amenities at home. Access to 
sanitation facilities and drinking water in the house is still a privilege that many Peruvians 
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do not enjoy, especially the poor. A simple analysis of the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer 
survey data4 shows that 68.4 per cent of Peruvians in the lowest income group have a 
toilet inside the house, compared to 94.9 per cent in the top income group. Access to 
water at home is also uneven. There is a 10 per cent difference in water access between 
the top and the bottom income groups. Finally, having a refrigerator at home to store 
food is also much more frequent among the rich. In the lowest income category, only 
44.3 per cent of respondents have a refrigerator, whereas 90.6 of individuals in the high-
est income category have a refrigerator. These differences suggest that the poor suffered 
the most when the Peruvian government imposed restrictions on movement, as they did 
not have adequate housing and services.
In addition to inadequate living conditions, the working circumstances in Peru also 
make quarantining a difficult task that only a few can accomplish. About 68.5 per cent of 
Peruvians are employed in informal jobs with precarious labour arrangements, a rate that 
is disproportionately higher among the poorest Peruvians. We show in Appendix B in 
supplemental material that 89.9 per cent of employed Peruvians in the lowest income 
group work informal jobs, whereas employment informality among the highest income 
group drops to 45.9 per cent. Finally, having access to internet and a computer became 
essential to navigate the quarantine. Yet, only 37.5 per cent of Peruvians have access to 
the internet and 40.8 per cent own a computer (see Appendix B). Here, there are also 
stark socioeconomic gaps: in the top income group, 72.4 per cent have access to the 
internet and 77.2 own a computer at home, while in the bottom income group, only 11.5 
per cent have internet and 13.4 per cent own a computer. This technology gap made it 
more challenging to accept mobility restrictions, as it effectively deprived a large popu-
lation of the only financial lifeline they had.
Economic Vulnerability, Policy Attitudes, and Social 
Distancing
We have shown that different socioeconomic groups in Peru face completely different 
realities, and these distinctions can have a direct impact on how these groups experience 
the pandemic. On the one hand, more privileged individuals have protected jobs, can 
work remotely, shop online for groceries and other essentials, and have basic amenities 
in their dwellings. On the other hand, more economically vulnerable people (and in par-
ticular, poor informal workers) rapidly suffer devastating consequences because they are 
unable to work or engage in other essential activities (e.g. banking or grocery shopping) 
remotely. In this section, we discuss how these different realities might have shaped 
people’s attitudes towards COVID-19 containment measures and their willingness to 
engage in a number of social and professional activities during the first wave of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in Peru.
We argue that Peruvians reacted to COVID-19 containment measures by considering 
the costs and benefits associated with those measures for them and for their families. 
This argument builds on a vast literature in psychology, economics, and political science 
that has demonstrated that self- interest is a powerful motivator of policy attitudes and 
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human behaviours (Becker, 1993; Cialdini, 1991; Downs, 1957). Self- interest can be 
defined as “the motive to maximise material resources and to minimise harm to one’s 
wealth and health” (Kim, 2014: 100). This definition juxtaposes the two elements (mate-
rial wealth and health) that were threatened by the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, policy 
and media communications often framed COVID-19 containment policies as presenting 
a trade- off between public health and economic well- being (Carreras et al., 2020; 
Deslatte, 2020; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2020).
We postulate that people with different socioeconomic statuses weighed material and 
health considerations differently when forming their views on restrictive quarantine 
measures during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. People who are in a position 
of relative economic privilege (i.e. formal white- collar workers with higher incomes) 
were able to maintain a steady source of income by working remotely. They also enjoyed 
basic amenities in their homes such as internet services, running water, and sanitation, 
which are critical to be able to stay at home during a prolonged lockdown period. Given 
the fact that their basic material needs were secure during this period, more privileged 
sectors of the Peruvian population may have reacted more favourably to strict quarantine 
measures. In all likelihood, this population group was primarily concerned with the rapid 
spread of a new disease with no known cure or effective treatment.
While clearly not oblivious to the health risks posed by COVID-19, the attitudes of 
more economically vulnerable groups towards COVID-19 containment measures may 
have been shaped more strongly by material concerns. As detailed in the previous sec-
tion, poor informal workers in Peru cannot work remotely and they can suffer dire eco-
nomic consequences if they don’t go to work every day. Economically vulnerable groups 
in developing countries also lack savings to overcome these economic challenges. In the 
words of a street vendor in Mexico City, “people with money can stay one, two, even 
three months at home […] but those of us who live day- to- day have no financial support” 
(Sheridan, 2020). The result is that lockdown measures adopted to fight the COVID-19 
pandemic can lead to extreme poverty and hunger among these fragile sectors of the 
population. We argue that these material considerations shape the attitudes of vulnerable 
economic groups towards quarantine measures. In particular, we expect that these sec-
tors of the Peruvian population are less likely to endorse lockdown measures.
This theoretical expectation builds on a large literature that has demonstrated that 
self- interest shapes the policy attitudes of individuals with different socioeconomic sta-
tus on a range of issues, including welfare programmes (Baslevent and Kirmanoglu, 
2011), trade (Fordham and Kleinberg, 2012), taxation (Hammar et al., 2008; 
Hennighausen and Heinemann, 2015), immigration (Nteta, 2013), and housing policies 
(Marble and Nall, forthcoming). For instance, people with a low socioeconomic status 
tend to prefer higher levels of wealth redistribution (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019) and 
have less favourable views on low- skilled immigration (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).
Other studies have challenged these self- interest explanations by showing that sym-
bolic predispositions (acquired through socialisation) can trump self- interest in attitude 
formation (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Lau and Heldman, 2009). This is especially true 
when there are partisan cues that frame issues in a way that bring these symbolic 
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predispositions to the forefront of individuals’ considerations (Sears and Funk, 1991; 
Sears et al., 1980). In the United States, lockdown measures and mask mandates adopted 
to fight the spread of COVID-19 were often framed as a violation of people’s freedom 
by the conservative media and some Republican leaders. Given the importance of sym-
bolic predispositions emphasising freedom from government intervention among 
Republicans, this framing led to a partisan gap in attitudes towards (and compliance 
with) COVID-19 public health guidelines in the United States (Allcott et al., 2020; 
Gadarian et al., 2021; Utych, 2021). Calvo and Ventura (2021) report a similar finding in 
Brazil, where supporters of President Bolsonaro (a right- wing politician who declared 
the pandemic a hoax) were less likely to perceive the COVID-19 pandemic as a risk to 
their health.
In Peru, there is no clear cultural or symbolic predisposition that shaped views on 
containment measures to fight the pandemic. Unlike in the aforementioned cases, no 
political cleavage emerged on this issue; rather, a political consensus rapidly emerged 
regarding the importance of complying with public health recommendations. Moreover, 
the COVID-19 pandemic was a new issue that people had not encountered in the past 
(that is, no preconceived notions on how to best respond to a pandemic). As a result, we 
expect that self- interest played a very important role in shaping people’s attitudes 
towards quarantine measures and social distancing recommendations.
Beyond the novelty of this policy issue, we also expect self- interest to trump sym-
bolic predispositions in most developing countries because the costs associated with 
lockdown measures were clear and immediately felt by individuals living in a situation 
of economic vulnerability. Previous research has demonstrated that self- interest plays a 
key role in shaping attitudes when people can easily identify how they are affected by a 
policy (Chong et al., 2001; Green and Gerken, 1989; Sears and Funk, 1990). This is 
especially true in the economic arena. In the words of Kim (2014: 109), “policies that 
affect voters’ pocketbooks have shown clear self- interest effects, presumably because 
voters can easily understand that they are financially affected by those policies and easily 
calculate a cost- benefit analysis of the passage of those policies.” Clearly, COVID-19 
lockdown measures are a good example of such a high- stakes policy since they directly 
and immediately affected the livelihood of individuals with a low socioeconomic status. 
This discussion yields the first hypothesis of the article.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals in a situation of economic vulnerability are less likely to support 
lockdown measures to stop the spread of COVID-19.
Attitudes towards costly quarantine measures matter because policy attitudes can shape 
behaviour. Diminished support for quarantine under economic distress can lead to lower 
compliance with preventive measures (Hargreaves Heap et al., 2020). More specifically, 
we expect that people with a low socioeconomic status were more willing to leave their 
homes to work during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the uncer-
tainty surrounding the new illness. A study conducted in Israel (an OECD country) 
shows that compliance with quarantine measures was significantly lower among people 
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who were concerned about loss of income (Bodas and Peleg, 2020). As detailed above, 
poor informal workers in developing countries have an even stronger incentive to go out 
to work during the pandemic to maintain their livelihood. However, we argue that this 
non- compliance emerges out of economic necessity rather than lack of concern with the 
severity of the public health crisis. We therefore do not expect significant differences in 
the willingness to engage in social activities (e.g. eating out or meeting friends) between 
economically privileged and economically fragile sectors of the Peruvian population 
during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals in a situation of economic vulnerability were more willing to go 
out of their houses to work during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Hypothesis 3: Individuals in a situation of economic vulnerability were not more willing to 
go out of their houses to engage in social activities during the first wave of the COVID-19 
pandemic.
Socioeconomic Conditions and COVID-19
To understand the differential impact of the pandemic on people’s attitudes towards 
COVID-19 measures in Peru, we implemented a nationally representative survey by 
telephone between 21 May and 28 May 2020. Our sample is composed of 1,490 respon-
dents across the entire country. The survey included socioeconomic variables and 
COVID- related questions.
Peru is an ideal place to study attitudes and preferences towards COVID-19 policies 
because the government implemented strict measures early on, which were very difficult 
to enforce. In fact, to avoid discouraging compliance, the government updated the 
national quarantine characteristics every two weeks (as the timeline in Appendix A 
shows). By the time we implemented our survey in late May, the government had 
announced a plan for re- opening the economy. The restrictions on movement thus had 
begun to loosen up, and compliance with public health recommendations had become 
voluntary.
Our key independent variable captures the socioeconomic vulnerabilities in Peru, to 
then be able to check whether people who are less privileged than others have different 
attitudes regarding measures to stop or contain the spread of the virus. Instead of just 
using one single question to measure socioeconomic vulnerabilities, we use an indicator 
constructed by the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos that uses a weighted average of key 
questions such as educational level and access to goods and services such as the internet, 
a computer, a bathroom, and private health insurance (see Appendix D in supplemental 
material for more details). This variable allows us to capture the multi- dimensionality of 
socioeconomic vulnerability by paying attention to the different factors that can explain 
it, such as a lack of health insurance, internet, or a bathroom. This socioeconomic indi-
cator uses values from 1 to 8, so we standardise it to express its changes in standard 
deviation units, thus facilitating the interpretation of the main analyses.
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In the case of the dependent variables, we use multiple questions that allow us to 
capture diverse dimensions of the sanitary and economic problems that Peru was facing 
with the spread of COVID-19. The first set of questions captures people’s preferences: 
support for the quarantine, support for re- opening the economy, and support for re- 
opening gyms.5 The second set of questions measures people’s willingness to do certain 
activities in the near future:6 to go out to work, to attend a religious service, to meet up 
with friends, to go to the mall, and to eat out. All of the dependent variables have a binary 
structure facilitating the interpretation of the results and comparability across 
outcomes.7
To learn about differential attitudes across levels of socioeconomic vulnerabilities in 
Peru, we use a linear probability model with fixed effects at the department level. In 
addition to socioeconomic vulnerability, we include a binary indicator of health vulner-
abilities for COVID-19 in the household as an important control variable.8 After imple-
menting this model, we estimate the predicted probability of supporting COVID-19 
containment measures across the different values of the standardised socioeconomic 
vulnerability variable, which ranges from −2.73 to 1.46 standard deviation units. Figure 1 
summarises the results for respondents’ preferences.
We find that an increase by 1 standard deviation in socioeconomic vulnerability 
decreases support for quarantine by 3.22 percentage points [95 per cent CI: –5.68, –.76]. 
Similarly, a one- point increase in socioeconomic vulnerability actually increases support 
for opening the economy by 3.60 percentage points [95 per cent CI: 1.01, 6.18]. We do 
not find evidence of a relationship between socioeconomic vulnerability and support for 
opening gyms [95 per cent CI: −2.38, 2.14]. These results are consistent with hypothesis 
1, positing that individuals in a socioeconomically vulnerable situation are less likely to 
support lockdown measures. These preferences are likely to emerge because these 
Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities of Policy Preferences.
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populations do not have the working or housing conditions to withstand the lockdown. 
Their basic material needs at home are not met, and they cannot maintain a regular fam-
ily income by working remotely, given the limited access to internet and a computer.
Figure 2 summarises the results for people’s willingness to do certain activities after 
the lockdown. We find that an increase by 1 standard deviation in socioeconomic vulner-
ability increases a willingness to go out to work by 3.91 percentage points [95 per cent 
CI: 0.80, 7.03] and a willingness to go to religious services by 4.52 percentage points [95 
per cent CI: 2.41, 6.64]. We did not find evidence for a willingness to meet up with 
friends [95 per cent CI: −2.16, 0.71], go to the mall [95 per cent CI: −1.11, 3.24], or eat 
out [95 per cent CI: −2.10, 0.41] in the next few weeks. These results are consistent with 
our theoretical expectations that people in a situation of economic vulnerability are more 
likely to ignore stay- at- home recommendations because of economic necessity. In line 
with hypothesis 2, we observe that economically vulnerable individuals report a greater 
willingness to leave home to go to work than economically privileged ones. In contrast, 
in line with hypothesis 3, we find no evidence of non- compliance when it comes to social 
activities unrelated to work. The economically vulnerable are as likely as the economi-
cally privileged to skip or postpone social activities (i.e. eating out, going to the mall, or 
meeting up with friends). Compliance with these social activities might be a realistic 
option for economically vulnerable individuals because their financial lifeline does not 
depend on them. An interesting exception emerges concerning attending religious ser-
vices. In contrast to hypothesis 3, economically vulnerable individuals are, in fact, more 
willing to defy public health recommendations to attend a religious service. This unex-
pected finding is probably due to the fact that religiosity is stronger among poor citizens 
(Herzer and Strulik, 2017).
Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Willingness to Engage in Activities.
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Discussion and Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic obliged governments in different parts of the world to adopt strict 
containment measures, such as curfews or lockdowns. Enforcing these measures is difficult 
and costly. To a large extent, governments had to rely on public support for lockdowns and 
people’s voluntary adherence to public health guidelines. Previous studies have demon-
strated that factors such as age, gender, education, ideology, and partisanship shape compli-
ance with COVID-19 measures (Allcott et al., 2020; Brouard et al., 2020; Calvo and Ventura, 
2021; Carreras et al., forthcoming; Gadarian et al., 2021).
In this article, we show that socioeconomic status is a critical factor shaping support for 
containment measures and compliance with stay- at- home orders in Peru, a country with a 
high level of economic inequality. In particular, the results show that economically vulnera-
ble individuals (i.e. poor and informal workers) were less likely to endorse strict lockdown 
measures in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, people with a low socio-
economic status expressed a greater willingness to leave their homes to go to work despite 
the public health emergency.
We argue that the attitudinal and behavioural differences between the haves and the 
have- nots are due to digital inequalities and poor housing conditions (e.g. a lack of san-
itation and overcrowding) that make long periods of confinement much harder to bear 
for low- income individuals in developing countries. The willingness of people with a 
low socioeconomic status to leave their houses to go to work is connected with the fact 
that most of them have informal jobs that cannot be performed remotely. Moreover, not 
going to work can very quickly put them in dire financial straits because they lack sav-
ings and the benefits associated with jobs in the formal economy.
We do not think, however, that economically vulnerable people are less concerned or less 
informed about COVID-19. There is no reason why they should be. In fact, our results indi-
cate that people with a low socioeconomic status were not more likely than wealthy individ-
uals to engage in enjoyable social activities that were not financially rewarding (e.g. meeting 
up with friends or eating out) during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic. This 
strongly suggests that economic considerations are the primary driver of the attitudinal and 
behavioural differences uncovered in this article.
While our article focused on Peru, other studies and journalistic accounts confirm that 
throughout Latin America the poor suffered disproportionately from the effects of lockdowns 
and were less likely to comply with stay- at- home orders (Ioris, 2020; Levy Yeyati and 
Malamud, 2020; Sandin, 2020). For instance, Hummel et al. (2021) show that labour infor-
mality and economic inequities in Bolivia led to a relaxation of stay- at- home orders and 
more severe COVID-19 outbreaks in the poorest departments. In a similar vein, Bennett 
(2021) demonstrates that quarantine compliance and effectiveness was lower in poor areas in 
Chile. Finally, Rodrigo Zarazaga (2020) (an Argentinian priest and political scientist) com-
mented that the long period of lockdown in Argentina shuttered the income of independent 
and informal workers (almost one half of the Argentinian working population). He also 
claimed that “overcrowding conditions, lack of public services, precarious health systems, 
and food shortages makes social distancing almost an impossible mission in shantytowns 
and poor neighbourhoods” (Zarazaga, 2020).
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The differential impact of COVID-19 containment measures (and of the pandemic itself) 
in Latin America raises important policy questions. What can Latin American governments 
do to help their most fragile populations during public health emergencies? Many Latin 
American governments expanded cash transfers to the poor and informal workers to sustain 
incomes and facilitate stay- at- home orders. These are commendable and necessary mea-
sures. However, precisely because these groups are often outside of the formal economy, not 
all the government help reached those most in need in a timely manner (Busso et al., 2020; 
Rauls, 2020). Moreover, many people who lack access to online banking had to wait in line 
for long hours, which increased their risk of exposure to COVID-19. In Peru, the economic 
support measures included four cash transfer programmes: Bono Yo Me Quedo en Casa, 
Bono Rural, Bono Independiente, and Bono Universal Familiar. While some of these trans-
fers targeted self- employed and informal workers, the databases used were incomplete and 
outdated (Blofield et al., 2020; Jaramillo and López, 2021; OECD, 2020). In addition to the 
deficiencies in targeting and registering beneficiaries, the difficulties for an orderly and 
timely distribution of cash transfers meant that some households most in need did not receive 
help or did so only several months into the pandemic. Blofield et al. (2020: 51) show that 
only about 60 per cent of the informal population in Peru was reached by the emergency cash 
transfer programmes implemented during the pandemic, leaving an important coverage gap.
In addition to cash transfers, Latin American governments need to make sure that eco-
nomically vulnerable people have access to food and essential medication during this period. 
Since the presence of state institutions is weak in the low- income areas of many Latin 
American countries (O’Donnell, 1993), governments should collaborate with social move-
ments and grassroots actors to make sure that the vital needs of the economically vulnerable 
sectors of the population are met (Hummel et al., 2021; Zarazaga, 2020). The governments 
should also make sure that the informal workers who simply cannot stop working (e.g. food 
vendors in public markets) do so safely. Good quality personal protective equipment should 
be distributed widely among frontline informal workers who are in frequent contact with 
other people to prevent large outbreaks, such as the one that took place in Latin America’s 
largest market, the Mercado Central de Abasto in Mexico City (Sheridan, 2020). More 
broadly, Latin American governments should learn from the COVID-19 pandemic and 
develop rapid response plans detailing how they will assist their most economically vulnera-
ble populations in future public health emergencies. The significant database updates that 
accompanied the welfare policy expansion efforts during the COVID-19 crisis (Blofield 
et al., 2020) should allow governments to respond more swiftly and effectively to the next 
pandemic or crisis.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, 
and/or publication of this article.
Funding




Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Notes
1. For a review of the varied social protection measures adopted in Latin America during the 
COVID-19 crisis, see Blofield et al. (2020).
2. Hundreds of people violating the curfew were arrested and issued fines: https:// elperuano. 
pe/ noticia- presidente- anuncia- multa- para- quienes- incumplan- cuarentena- por- coronavirus- 
94363. aspx
3. See Appendix B.
4. See questions in Appendix C in supplemental material.
5. These answers use the following scale: 1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neither agree nor 
disagree, 4. Agree, and 5. Strongly agree.
6. Because the lockdown restrictions were still in place.
7. In the case of the preference questions that take a five-point scale, we generate a binary indica-
tor of agree or strongly agree with the main statement.
8. This item is based on the following question: “We know that people with certain diseases or 
pre-existing conditions are the most vulnerable to COVID-19 (i.e. those older than 65 and 
those with chronic diseases such as diabetes, hypertension, cancer, and cardiovascular or pul-
monary conditions). Do you or someone in your home belong to this group?”
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